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Abstract
I set up a linear model of a cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly. Even where countries are small, there
exists a motive for protection to achieve a prot-shift and to raise revenue. Where the protection
is of tari¤ form, then the protection will only totally exclude the foreign rm for a limited set of
parameter values. By contrast, where the protection takes the form of a horizontal technical barrier
to trade (HTBT), the government will always exclude the foreign rm. Where there is no constraint
on imposing tari¤s, these will always be preferred to the HTBT. However, if tari¤ reductions are
imposed by international agreement without simultaneous restrictions on HTBTs, then reductions
below a threshold level will trigger imposition of an HTBT su¢ cient to totally exclude the foreign
rm.
Keywords: Duopoly, trade, protection.
JEL classication: F12, F15, C70.
As tari¤ barriers have been reduced, attention of trade negotiators has increasingly focused upon
technical barriers to trade (TBTs). These consist of national regulations and standards, which allegedly
discriminate in favour of home rms or consumers against foreign rms. While there has been much
discussion of these issues by policymakers, the theory of such alleged protection is rather less developed.
Indeed, as Maskus and Wilson (2000) acknowledge, the whole issue of regulatory trade barriers is complex,
simply because regulations often serve valid social or economic objectives, and yet they may be tweaked
for strategic reasons.
Regulatory di¤erences can usefully be classied as vertical or horizontal: the former result in measur-
able improvements in quality experienced by customers or others (such as reducing unreliability, pollution
or safety problems). Strategic bias in vertical standard setting can result in either greater- or less-than-
optimal trade, depending on the underlying model.1
This paper focuses on a narrow case - that of pure, horizontal trade barriers in a linear Cournot
duopoly, where rms based in di¤erent countries produce output which is experienced as identical quality
by consumers, even though using di¤erent technology. I show that, where a country is free to impose a
tari¤, it will not impose a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT). Only under a limited set
of circumstances will the prot-shift e¤ect be su¢ cient to lead to total exclusion of the foreign rm: in
other conditions, the country will set a tari¤ yielding some revenue. By contrast, if tari¤s are outlawed,
then the importing country will impose an HTBT to exclude the foreign rm completely. If tari¤s are
constrained by international agreement, then this will occur if and only if tari¤s are reduced below a
threshold level.
1 Linear model of pure, horizontal protection
In order to understand the possible motivation for pure, horizontal protection in the case of a small
country, I concentrate on a duopolistic industry. The two rms, 1 and 2, are assumed to produce output,
X1 and X2. Concentrating on country 1, Firm 1 is local, while rm 2 is foreign. Both rms produce at
1Das and Donnenfeld (1989) and Lutz (1996 and 2000) nd barriers reduce trade. Edwards (2004) nds the reverse.
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constant marginal costs, 1 and 1; which are not necessarily equal. Produce is not di¤erentiated. For
simplicity, I assume that utility is of a quadratic form, yielding the linear inverse demand function
P = a  b(X1 +X2): (1)
Consequently, consumer surplus,
V = b(X1 +X2)
2=2: (2)
Firm f makes Cournot assumptions about its rival, gs output. Consequently, fs conjecture of its
own prot is
cf = (a  f   tf   f )Xf   bXf (Xf +Xcg); (3)
where tf is a tari¤ on rm fs output, and f is a per-unit conversion cost for selling its output, resulting
from a regulatory barrier imposed by country 1. I drop the subscripts on t and  , since I assume that a
country will not impose tari¤s or regulatory barriers against its own producer.
I nd each rms reaction function by di¤erentiating (3) with respect to Xf ; and then derive the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium on the assumption that actual output of each rm equals its rivals conjecture
of its output :
X1 = (a  21 + 2 + t+ )=3b; (4a)
X2 = (a+ 1   22   2t  2)=3b; (4b)
Z = X1 +X

2 = (2a  1   2   t  )=3b; (4c)
where Z denotes combined sales.
Country 1 is assumed to set its policy to maximise its own welfare, which is the sum of consumer
surplus, tari¤revenue and the home rms prot. It is assumed the government in country 1 can accurately
predict the outcome of the subgame between the two rms, and so can act as a rst mover on behalf of
rm 1. This is in the tradition of models of strategic bias in a duopoly setting, such as Brander (1981)
or Brander and Spencer (1985).
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of tari¤ and regulatory barrier setting, it is worth noting:
Proposition 1 If the country is free to set tari¤s, and if the welfare-maximising tari¤s are not so high
as to exclude the foreign rm, then it will not impose a pure, horizontal regulatory barrier.
Proof. This follows since any level of {X1X2} which can be achieved with ft = 0;  = kg can also be
achieved with ft = k;  = 0g: However, in the latter case, the tari¤ will yield a positive revenue.
First, I will examine tari¤-setting in the case where the country is free to set any level of tari¤s (and
will therefore set  = 0).
2 Unconstrained tari¤-setting
Country 1s welfare can be written as
W 01 = (a  )X 01 + bZ 0(Z 0   2X 01)=2 + t(Z 0  X 01); (5)
with the prime denoting the case with unconstrained tari¤s. Noting that @X1=@t = 1=3b; @Z=@t =
 1=3b;the rst-order condition for an optimum is
@W 01=@t = (3a  21   2)=3b  t=b = 0: (6)
which will be satised by
t = (3a  21   2)=3: (7)
Note that, when a < (21 + 2)=3;no tari¤ will be set. Assuming this is not the case, a tari¤ of t

will lead to imports of
X2 = ( 3a+ 71   42)=9b; (8)
which will fall to zero if
a > (71   42)=3: (9)
Between these two levels, the tari¤ will be positive, but not su¢ cient to exclude rm 2 completely.
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3 Setting a pure, horizontal barrier when there is no tari¤
Now assume that tari¤s are ruled out. The question is whether the country can raise its welfare by setting
a pure, horizontal barrier against the imported good, 2, and if so how high.
Since t = 0, we can drop the nal term in (5), and the marginal gain from raising a non-tari¤ barrier
is
@W1=@ = [2 +    1]=3b: (10)
Notice that, as long as 2 is not smaller than 1; this will be positive. Also that:
Proposition 2 If the government of a small country chooses to impose a pure horizontal regulatory
barrier to increase welfare, it will set a su¢ ciently large barrier to exclude the foreign rm from its
market.
Proof. This follows from the fact that @W1=@ is monotonically increasing with respect to  ; up to the
point where the foreign rm is excluded.
In a linear Cournot duopoly model with no xed costs of market entry, the price in the market as the
foreign rms share is reduced to zero tends to the monopoly price, and reaches it at the point where the
foreign rm quits the market. National welfare at this point is given by
WM = 1M + VM = 3(a  1)2=8b: (11)
This compares with national welfare in the absence of tari¤ or regulatory barriers of
cW = b1 + bV = (a  21 + 2)2=9b+ (2a  1   2)2=18b: (12)
Lemma 3 If ja  1j > 2 j1   2j and there are no tari¤s, then the country is better o¤ excluding the
foreign rm.
Proof. This follows by setting WM = cW and rearranging, yielding
ja  1j > 2 j1   2j : (13)
Proposition 4 If the country is unable to set a tari¤, then if the condition in equation (12) is met, it
will set a regulatory barrier to exclude the foreign rm.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.
4 Combination of a pure horizontal barrier and a tari¤
I now assume the country sets a tari¤, but this is xed by international treaty at t < t:In these
circumstances, the marginal e¤ect of a pure horizontal regulatory barrier on country 1s welfare, using
the double prime to indicate the case with a xed rate of tari¤s, can be simplied to
@W 00=@ = [ 1 + 2 +    t]=3b: (14)
When  = 0; a marginal increase in  will only increase welfare if 2   1 > t: However, @W 00=@ is
increasing with respect to  ; so even if a marginal increase in  does not increase welfare, a larger increase
may do so. Proposition 2 continues to hold, so if the government chooses to set a pure horizontal barrier,
it will set a large enough barrier to exclude the foreign rm completely. However, if it sets such a barrier
it will be foregoing the revenue of the tari¤. It follows that, if relatively high tari¤s are allowed, the
government may prefer to allow the foreign rm to sell in the market, avoiding any regulatory barrier.
However, if the maximum tari¤ allowed, t, falls below a threshold level, et; then the government will prefer
the regulatory barrier, and forego the tari¤ revenue.
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I denote welfare where the tari¤ is set at t and there is no regulatory barrier as Wt. Welfare if the
foreign rm is excluded is stillWM as in equation (10). Consequently, the country will be better imposing
no regulatory barrier if and only if Wt > WM :
The threshold value of t = et; below which a regulatory barrier will be imposed, should satisfy When
1 = 2 = ; d = 0 and c = a  : Consequently, (14) becomeset = c=6 = (a  )=6: (15)
There follows
Proposition 5 If the two rmsmarginal costs are equal, then if the government is constrained to set a
tari¤ of less than (a  )=6, it will impose a regulatory barrier to exclude the foreign rm. By contrast,
for higher tari¤ rates, it will not impose a regulatory barrier.
Proof. This follows since, for t < (a  )=6;WM > Wt; while for t > (a  )=6;WM > Wt.
5 Conclusion
By focusing on pure horizontal barriers, this paper concentrates on the most clear-cut case for the
prosecution, in the situation where barriers exist for no reason other than regulatory protection. It is
shown that, in theory, this protection can potentially impede trade, and that this impediment can increase
as tari¤ liberalisation proceeds. However, HTBTs are not the instrument of rst choice for protection,
but can become attractive if other instruments are ruled out or limited. Under the conditions of this
model, tari¤ liberalisation beyond a point can be counterproductive, unless HTBTs are constrained by
harmonisation or mutual recognition agreements.
There is, however, a caveat. I have concentrated on the linear case due to its relative expositional
simplicity. These results do not generalise to vertical protection2 , and whether they carry over to models
with nonlinear demand functions requires further investigation.
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Appendix (for the referees): equation derivations
Utility is given by
U = a(X1 +X2)  b(X1 +X2)2=2:
I assume b > c. The rst order conditions for consumer optimisation are
P1 = a  b(X1 +X2); (1)
P2 = a  b(X1 +X2):
Firmsrevenue is
R1 = aX1   bX1(X1 +X2);
R2 = aX2   bX2(X1 +X2):
Consumer surplus
V = U  R1  R2;
= a(X1 +X2)  b(X1 +X2)2=2
 (aX1   bX1(X1 +X2))  (aX2   bX2(X1 +X2))
= b(X1 +X2)
2=2: (2)
Let the two rmstotal costs be
C1 = 1X1;
C2 = (2 + )X2;
where  is a per unit conversion cost for rm 2 to comply with the standard in country 1. Hence
conjectured prot is
c1 = (a  1)X1   bX1(X1 +Xc2); (3a)
c2 = (a  2   t  )X2   bX2(Xc1 +X2): (3b)
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
Di¤erentiating (3a) and (5b) with respect to X1 and X2 respectively, we obtain the rst-order condi-
tions for conjectured prot maximisation, which give the reaction functions of the two rms.
@c1=@X1 = a  1   2bX1   bXc2 = 0;
X1 = (a  1   bXc2)=2b;
@c2=@X2 = a  2   t     2bX2   bXc1 ;
X2 = (a  2   t     bXc1)=2b;
Setting X1 = Xc1 = X

1 and X2 = X
c
2 = X

2 , we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
2bX1 = a  1   bX2 ;
2bX2 = a  2   t     bX1 ;
= a  2   t     (a  1   bX2 )=2;
4bX2 = a+ 1   22   2t  2 + bX2 ;
X2 = (a+ 1   22   2t  2)=3b;
2bX1 = a  1   (a+ 1   22   2t  2)=3;
6bX1 = 2a  41 + 22 + 2t+ 2 ;
3bX1 = a  21 + 2 + t+  ;
X1 = (a  21 + 2 + t+ )=3b (4a)
X2 = X

1 + (1   2)=3b  t=b  =b: (4b)
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If Z = X1 +X

2 , then
U = aZ   bZ2=2:
Since price,
P  = a  bZ;
then consumer surplus
V  = bZ2=2:
Analysis with just a tari¤
Set  = 0: The tari¤ raises a revenue T1 for country 1s government of
T1 = tX2 = t(Z  X1):
Country 1s welfare now becomes
W 01 = bZ
02=2 + (a     bZ 0)X 01 + t(Z 0  X 01);
= (a  )X 01 + bZ 0(Z 0   2X 01)=2 + t(Z 0  X 01): (5)
Note
Z = (a  21 + 2 + t+ )=3b+ (a+ 1   22   2t  2)=3b;
= (2a  1   2   t  )=3b;
@Z=@ = @Z=@t =  1=3b:
Also
@X1=@ = @X

1=@t = 1=3b:
Consequently
@W 01=@t = @V
0=@t+ @01=@t+ (Z
0  X 01) + t(@Z 0=@t  @X 01=@t);
=  Z 0=3 + (a  1   bZ 0)=3b+ bX 01=3b+ (Z 0  X 01) + t( 1=3b  1=3b);
= (a  1)  2Z 0=3 +X 01=3 + (Z 0  X 01)  2t=3b;
= (a  1) + (Z 0   2X 01)=3  2t=3b:
But, substituting in X 01 = (a  21 + 2 + t)=3b and Z 0 = (2a  1   2   t)=3b;
@W 01=@t = (a  1) + ((2a  1   2   t)  2(a  21 + 2 + t))=9b  2t=3b;
= (a  1) + (1   2   t)=3b  2t=3b;
= (3a  21   2   3t)=3b;
= (3a  21   2)=3b  t=b: (6)
Note that this is diminishing with respect to t. The rst-order condition for the welfare-maximising tari¤
in these circumstances is
@W 01=@t = 0 ==>
t = (3a  21   2)=3 = a  (21 + 2)=3: (7)
Note that, when
3a < 21 + 2;
no tari¤ will be set. Assuming this is not the case, a tari¤ of t will lead to imports of
X2 = (a+ 1   22   2t)=3b;
= (a+ 1   22   2a+ (41 + 22)=3)=3b;
= (3a+ 31   62   6a+ 41 + 22)=9b;
= ( 3a+ 71   42)=9b; (8)
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which will fall to zero if
a > (71   42)=3: (9)
Analysis with just a HTBT
Note that, as above
@Z=@ = @Z=@t =  1=3b;
@X1=@ = @X

1=@t = 1=3b:
If country 1s welfare W1 = V + 1, then
W1 = bZ
2=2 + (a  1   bZ)X1 ;
= (a  1)X1 + bZ(Z   2X1 )=2:
But, substituting in X1 = (a  21 + 2 + )=3b and Z = (2a  1   2   )=3b;
Z   2X1 = [(2a  1   2   )  2(a  21 + 2 + )]=3b;
= [31   32   3 ]=3b;
= (1   2   )=b:
@W1=@ = (a  1)(@X1=@) + (b=2)(Z   2X1 )(@Z=@) + (b=2)Z((@Z=@)  2(@X1=@))
= (a  1)=3b+ (b=2)((1   2   )=b)( 1=3b) + (b=2)Z( 1=b);
= (a  1)=3b  (1   2   )=6b  Z=2;
= (a  1)=3b  (1   2   )=6b  (2a  1   2   )=6b;
= [2(a  1)  (1   2   )  (2a  1   2   )]=6b;
= [ 21 + 22 + 2 ]=6b;
= [2 +    1]=3b; (10)
Note that @W1=@ is increasing with respect to  :@W1=@ is initially positive if and only if 2 > 1: in
other words, if the foreign rm is the higher-cost producer. In this case, the regulator will choose to raise
 up to the point where rm 2 leaves the market.
Total exclusion of the foreign rm
I assume rst of all that there is no xed cost of entry into country 1s market. Once rm 2 is excluded,
rm 1 acts as an unconstrained monopolist, facing an inverse demand curve
P = a  bX1:
Firm 1s prot is therefore
1 = (a  1)X1   bX21;
and the rst order condition for maximisation is
(a  1) = 2bX1M ;
X1M = (a  1)=2b:
However, note that this is the same level of output as implied by equation (6a) when  is su¢ ciently high
to drive Xc2 to zero. This means there is no sudden jump in prices once rm 2 exits the market.
Consequently,
1M = (a  1)2=2b  (a  1)2=4b;
= (a  1)2=4b:
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Consumer surplus
VM = bX
2
1M=2;
= (a  1)2=8b;
so that
WM = 1M + VM = 3(a  1)2=8b: (11)
By contrast, in the initial state where  = 0;
bX1 = (a  21 + 2)=3b;bX2 = (a+ 1   22)=3b;bZ = (2a  1   2)=3b:
Consequently,
b1 = (a  1) bX1   b bX1 bZ;
= bX1[(a  1)  b bZ];
= ((a  21 + 2)=3b)[(a  1)  b((2a  1   2)=3b)];
= ((a  21 + 2)=9b)[3(a  1)  (2a  1   2)];
= ((a  21 + 2)=9b)[a  21 + 2];
= (a  21 + 2)2=9b:
Meanwhile
bV = b bZ2=2;
= (2a  1   2)2=18b;
so that cW = b1 + bV = (a  21 + 2)2=9b+ (2a  1   2)2=18b: (12)
Consequently,
WM  cW = 3(a  1)2=8b  (a  21 + 2)2=9b  (2a  1   2)2=18b;
which will only be positive if
3(a  1)2=8b  (a  21 + 2)2=9b  (2a  1   2)2=18b > 0;
27(a  1)2=72b  8(a  21 + 2)2=72b  4(2a  1   2)2=72b > 0;
27(a  1)2 > 8(a  21 + 2)2 + 4(2a  1   2)2;
= 8((a  1) + (2   1))2 + 4((a  1) + (a  2))2;
Dene c = a  1; d = 1   2; a  2 = c+ d:
27(a  1)2 > 8((a  1) + (2   1))2 + 4((a  1) + (a  2))2;
27c2 > 8(c  d)2 + 4(2c+ d)2;
27c2 > 8c2   16cd+ 8d2 + 16c2 + 16cd+ 4d2;
3c2 > 12d2;
c2 > 4d2;
(a  1)2 > 4(1   2)2;
ja  1j > j2(1   2)j : (13)
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Combination of a tari¤ and an HTBT
A xed level t of tari¤ is assumed to be imposed, where 0 6 t 6 t: Country 1s welfare now becomes
W 001 = bZ
002=2 + (a     bZ 00)X 001 + t(Z 00  X 001 );
= (a  )X 001 + bZ 00(Z 00   2X 001 )=2 + t(Z 00  X 001 ):
The question is now what level of  will the country set?
@W 00=@ = (a )@X 001 =@+(b=2)(Z 00 2X 001 )(@Z 00=@)+(b=2)Z 00((@Z 00=@) 2(@X 001 =@))+t((@Z 00=@) (@X 001 =@)):
Note rst of all that @Z 00=@ =  1=3b and @X 001 =@ = 1=3b:Consequently, (31) becomes
@W 00=@ = (a  )=3b  (b=2)(Z 00   2X 001 )=3b  (1=2)Z 00   t(2=3b):
Now note that Z 00 = (2a  1   2   t  )=3b;X 001 = (a  21 + 2 + t+ )=3b; so that
Z 00   2X 001 = [(2a  1   2   t  )  2(a  21 + 2 + t+ )]=3b;
= [1   2   t   ]=b;
and (31a) becomes
@W 00=@ = (a  1)=3b  [1   2   t   ]=6b  (2a  1   2   t  )=6b  t(2=3b);
= [(2a  21)  (1   2   t  )  (2a  1   2   t  )  4t]=6b;
= [ 21 + 22 + 2   2t]=6b;
= [ 1 + 2 +    t]=3b: (14)
It follows that, when  = 0; this will only be positive if 2   1   2t > 0, which implies that
t < (2   1)=2:
Beyond this, however, @W 00=@ is increasing with respect to  : Consequently, if the condition in (33) is
satised then the country will set  high enough to exclude the foreign rm. Otherwise, the rm will set
 either at zero or at the level which excludes the foreign rm, depending which gives higher national
welfare.
When  = 0; national welfare is given by
Wt = (a  1)X 001 + bZ 00(Z 00   2X 001 )=2 + t(Z 00  X 001 ):
Z 00 = (2a  1   2   t  )=3b;X 001 = (a  21 + 2 + t+ )=3b:t = t;  = 0:
Note that
Z 00  X 001 = [(2a  1   2   t)  (a  21 + 2 + t)]=3b;
= (a+ 1   22   2t)=3b
= [2(a  2)  (a  1)  2t]=3b;
= [2(c+ d)  c  2t]=3b = [c+ 2d  2t]=3b:
Z 00   2X 001 = [(2a  1   2   t)  2(a  21 + 2 + t)]=3b;
= [1   2   t]=b = (d  t)=b;
bZ 00(Z 00   2X 001 ) = (2a  1   2   t)(d  t)=3b;
= (2c+ d  t)(d  t)=3b:
(a  1)X 001 = c(a  21 + 2 + t)=3b;
= c(c  d+ t)=3b:
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So
Wt = c(c  d+ t)=3b+ (2c+ d  t)(d  t)=6b+ t[c+ 2d  2t]=3b;
= f2c(c  d+ t) + (2c+ d  t)(d  t) + 2t[c+ 2d  2t]g=6b:
WM = 3c
2=8b:
Consequently, the condition for welfare to be higher with a monopoly is
3c2=8b > c(c  d+ t)=3b+ (2c+ d  t)(d  t)=6b+ t[c+ 2d  2t]=3b;
9c2=24b > 8c(c  d+ t)=24b+ 4(2c+ d  t)(d  t)=24b+ 8t[c+ 2d  2t]=24b;
9c2 > 8c(c  d+ t) + 4(2c+ d  t)(d  t) + 8t[c+ 2d  2t];
9c2 > 8c2   8cd+ 8ct+ 4(2cd  2ct  2dt+ d2 + t2) + 8[ct+ 2dt  2t2];
c2 > 4d2 + 8(c+ d)t  12t2;
The threshold value of t = et should satisfy
12et2   8(c+ d)et  4d2 + c2 = 0;et = [8(c+ d)p64(c+ d)2   48(c2   4d2)]=24;et = (c+ d)=3p4(c+ d)2   3(c2   4d2)=6;
= (c+ d)=3 (c+ 4d)=6;
= (c  2d)=6 or (2c+ 6d)=6:
When 1 = 2 = ; the rst root becomes et = (a  )=6: (15)
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